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Abstract
We develop a model of statistical evidence with a sophisticated Bayesian fact-finder.
The context is litigation, where a litigant (defendant or plaintiff) may disclose hard
evidence and a jury (the fact-finder) interprets it. In addition to hard evidence, the
litigant has private unverifiable information. We study the robustness of the parties’
reasoning regarding the legal fundamentals and the litigant’s strategic behavior. The
litigant’s choice of whether to disclose hard evidence entails two channels of informa-
tion: the face-value signal of the hard evidence disclosure (relating to the probabilities
that the hard evidence exists in different states of the world) and as a possible signal of
the litigant’s private information. Our results suggest that in some situations, a desire
for robust reasoning about evidence would lead the court to restrict the admissibility of
some relevant evidence. The modeling exercise provides support for the Federal Rules
of Evidence Rules 403 and 404, along with general conclusions about evidence policy.
∗Bull: Florida International University; Watson: UC San Diego. The authors thanks Alex Weiss for
superb research assistance. They are also grateful to the following people for providing input: Dan Klerman,
Aaron Kolb, Alex Lee, Herb Newhouse, Eric Talley, Simon Wilkie, and seminar participants at Indiana
University, USC, UC Riverside, UCF, the 2015 Law and Economic Theory conference, the 2017 American
Law and Economics Association conference, the 2016 Canadian Law and Economics Association conference,
and the Fall 2017 Midwest Economic Theory conference.
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1 Introduction
The traditional “information theory” of evidence in litigation holds that, assuming fact-
finders can process and interpret information well, evidence is always beneficial because
it provides information about the underlying matter to be resolved. Thus, courts should
allow a wide range of evidence, however complicated and without regard to weight. An
alternative view maintains that fact-finders face cognitive limitations and may have difficulty
dealing with complicated or varied information. Courts then have an interest in constraining
evidence in ways that would help fact-finders avoid inferential error, although the exact policy
conclusions are not so clear.1
We develop an alternative theory of evidence, distinct from the information and cognitive-
limitation views, that has direct implications for the design of evidentiary rules. Our model
examines the interaction between a litigant and a fact-finder whom we generally take to
be a jury. Retaining the information theory’s assumption of reasoned fact-finders, we show
that constructive evidence requires alignment of the litigant’s and fact-finder’s beliefs about
the meaning of evidence. This meaning is generally not fixed because it relates to the
circumstances under which the litigant would choose to disclose available evidence, and the
parties may have different beliefs about the litigant’s behavior. Absent coordination of beliefs
and behavior, some types of evidence may be misleading in that they cause the fact-finder
to update her belief in the opposite direction than she would if she knew the litigant’s actual
disclosure strategy.
Our theory provides a different behavioral foundation than does the cognitive-limitation
view. Essentially, it is not so much a problem of fact-finders lacking the ability to process
information but rather a problem of fact-finders having great latitude in how they might
interpret evidence due to the presence of private information on the part of the litigant.
Where the interpretive latitude is wide, fact-finders may not accurately predict a litigant’s
disclosure strategy, resulting in misleading evidence to society’s detriment. The prospect of
misleading evidence is inherent in the nature of hard evidence and the severity of the problem
depends on the statistical parameters. Therefore, courts may do well to make some evidence
inadmissible, as in Rules 403 and 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and in common law,
1Gold (1986) discusses how fact-finders may err in determining how probative evidence is or may demon-
strate systematically biased reasoning in evaluating the evidence presented to them. Langevoort (1998)
surveys behavioral theories of judgment and decision making in legal scholarship. A prominent theory is the
“story view” of jury decision making, which postulates that fact-finders are best able to process evidence that
is woven into a coherent and simple story—especially if it has a linear logical progression and is supported
by analogous experience—and then compare alternative stories using available data. See Pennington and
Hastie (1986, 1991, 1992) and Hastie (1999).
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or to provide guidelines for its interpretation.
To understand the scope for interpretation, note that hard evidence is, by definition,
statistical in nature: An individual piece of evidence exists with different probabilities in
various states of the world. Hard evidence rarely provides definitive proof (that is, certainty)
that the state is in some set, but it gives a signal that allows a fact-finder to update from a
prior to a posterior probability distribution of the state.
For example, on the question of whether the defendant in a trial robbed a particular
store at 10:00 p.m. on a given date, the defendant may enter into evidence a time-stamped
surveillance video showing him at a stadium 20 miles away at 9:20 p.m. on the same date.
This piece of evidence does not prove with certainty that the defendant is innocent; it is
possible that traffic conditions on the day of the crime were such that the defendant could,
by leaving the stadium at 9:25 p.m. and speeding through the city, reach the store before
10:00 p.m.2 However, the defendant’s image on the stadium’s 9:20 p.m. surveillance video
is perhaps more likely to exist in the state of the world in which the defendant did not rob
the store than it would in the state of the world in which he did. Therefore, disclosure of
the surveillance video (the hard evidence in this illustration) may lead a sophisticated jury
(the fact-finder in this scenario) to update its belief about the defendant’s involvement in
the crime, raising the probability that the defendant is innocent but not raising it to 1.
By adding some details to the robbery sketch just described, we can illustrate the main
idea of our modeling exercise. One might have imagined that the hard-evidence video would
be disclosed if and only if it exists, so that the jury extracts from its disclosure exactly the
face-value signal that its existence or nonexistence provides. That is, the face-value signal
is the information that would be transmitted if the jury were to directly observe whether
the video exists, so that it performs a Bayes’-rule update about the defendant’s culpability
based on the probabilities that the video would exist conditional on guilt and conditional on
innocence.
However, a second channel of information operates with the surveillance video: It may
signal the defendant’s private information (the defendant’s type), in particular if the jury
thinks that different types of defendant would be inclined to disclose the video evidence with
different probabilities. For example, suppose the jury believes that a defendant who knows
he committed the crime (the “bad type”) is likely to disclose the video evidence when it
exists, whereas a defendant who knows that he didn’t commit the crime (the “good type”) is
less likely to do so. Then disclosure of the video evidence provides a signal of the defendant’s
2There may also be errors in the estimate of the time of the robbery and/or the video time stamp.
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type by way of the two types’ different disclosure probabilities. In this case disclosure would
cause the jury to update in the direction of the bad type, but it could go the other way if
the jury thought that the good type would be more likely to disclose video evidence.
Thus, disclosure of surveillance video showing the defendant at 9:20 p.m. provides in-
formation through two channels: the face-value signal relating to the existence of the video
and the signal of the defendant’s type implied by the types’ different disclosure probabilities.
Because both signals relate to the underlying state of interest—here the defendant’s guilt or
innocence—the jury combines them when updating about the state. If the face-value signal
is strong compared to the defendant-type signal, then the jury will update toward innocence
regardless of the jury’s belief about the defendant’s behavior. In such a case, the defendant
can conclude that disclosure of the surveillance video is sure to have a positive effect (from
the defendant’s point of view) and both types of defendant surely prefer to disclose, ensur-
ing that the information provided by the disclosure is exactly the face-value signal. Hard
evidence in this case is effective.
But if the face-value signal is relatively weak compared to the defendant-type signal, then
disclosure of the surveillance video could lead the jury to update toward either innocence
or guilt, depending on the jury’s belief about the defendant’s behavior. And then it is
possible—and consistent with rationality—for the good defendant to think the jury would
interpret disclosure as a signal of guilt (the jury believing that only the guilty type of
defendant would disclose), whereas the bad defendant has the opposite belief. Then the good
defendant would not disclose the hard evidence and the bad defendant would. Importantly,
the jury could rationally think only the good defendant would disclose, which makes the jury
update in precisely the wrong direction compared to what would happen if the jury knew the
defendant’s actual strategy. Hard evidence in this case is misleading and disadvantageous
to society.
The scenario can be embellished further by adding detail about the different types of
potential defendants and the choices made by them, law enforcement officers, and others
who influence whether the crime would be committed and whom might be charged. For
instance, one could imagine various types of defendant, including a sophisticated criminal
who meticulously plans to visit the stadium and walk in front of a remote security camera
before racing across town to rob the store. In general and in reality, litigants have private
unverifiable information in addition to hard evidence, and so a piece of hard evidence can
provide information to fact-finders both through its face-value signal and through its signal
of the litigant’s private information.
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To summarize, the example demonstrates that there are circumstances in which both
types of defendant and the jury are sophisticated Bayesians, they rationally best respond
to their beliefs, these facts are common knowledge between them, and yet hard evidence is
misleading to society’s detriment. Notably, this is a non-equilibrium phenomenon. As we
argue in the paper, there is good reason to doubt that players in the settings studied here
would coordinate on an equilibrium, much less society’s preferred equilibrium.3 Therefore,
our criterion for welfare analysis is robustness, which is the requirement that the litigation
process delivers the intended (socially desirable) outcomes whether or not the litigant and
fact-finder are coordinated on a desired equilibrium.
To evaluate robustness, the solution concept we employ is rationalizability, which identi-
fies the range of possible outcomes consistent with common knowledge of rationality (and not
necessarily beliefs and behavior that are coordinated across players). Thus, a technical side-
point of this paper is to suggest robustness as an important criterion for legal institutions
and rationalizability as a useful concept for studying it. Our robustness criterion evaluates
whether evidence is meaningful and constructive in all rationalizable strategy profiles of our
litigation game. Our main point is a simple one: Robustness is difficult to achieve without
imposing some restrictions on admissibility of evidence and/or on how the fact-finder may
interpret evidence. In other words, to prevent misleading evidence, the court may optimally
restrict evidence. Our results provide justification for Rules of Evidence 403 and 404.
Before going on to the model, let us make a few comments regarding the related literature.
In the law-and-economics literature, two main approaches to modeling evidence stand out.4
The first treats evidence as statistical in nature, as just described, but it views evidence as
arriving exogenously. These models are exercises in Bayes’ rule but they address neither the
parties’ incentives to disclose evidence nor the fact-finder’s evaluation of these incentives. The
second modeling approach focuses on the incentives of the litigants to produce evidence, but
it views the adjudicator as a mechanistic system whose judgment is an exogenous function
of the quantities of evidence that the two sides produce. Evidence production is costly, and
each party’s marginal cost is higher in the state of the world that favors the other party.
These models treat evidence in an abstract way and they conclude that the types of litigants
3While experienced judges and attorneys may be more likely to think and behave in coordinated ways, it
is less likely that fact-finders (typically juries, whose members do not routinely hear cases) and litigants (who
may not have much experience in court) are so coordinated. In practice, the Rule 403 exclusion for potentially
misleading evidence is not viewed as necessary for bench trials, which have a judge in a fact-finding role.
See Capra (2001).
4Here we are summarizing Talley’s (2013) characterization of the law-and-economics literature on evi-
dence. See also Sanchirico (2010).
5
will be separated in equilibrium, yet the adjudicator does not utilize this signal.5
Some prominent entries in the literature feature both the litigants’ incentive to disclose
evidence and a Bayesian decision maker, but they assume an extreme view of hard evidence
as definitive proof of the state or some subset of possible states.6 There are also mechanism-
design models that seek to find the optimal judgment rule (a mechanism that maps feasible
evidence sets to judgments) under the assumption that the litigants will find their way to
an equilibrium in the induced evidence-production game.7 Tangentially related “Bayesian-
persuasion” models involve a sender committing to an informative experiment to influence
a receiver.8
In reality, the litigants control most pieces of evidence and disclosure is subject to their
individual incentives. Evidence is discrete and statistical; a piece of evidence either exists
or doesn’t exist, and the chance of existence depends on the state of the world. Producing
evidence may be costly, but the cost differential between states is typically small (for instance,
if the surveillance video exists, then a culpable defendant can just as easily obtain and present
it to the court as can a non-culpable defendant) or very large (such as the culpable defendant
having to fabricate it).9 Juries and other fact-finders are typically sophisticated enough to
assess the litigants’ incentives and recognize the signal inherent in the disclosure, or lack of
disclosure, of evidence.
The following section presents our basic model, which limits attention to a simple setting
with one litigant, a jury that will impose a judgment, and one “document” (the piece of hard
evidence) that the litigant may possess. In Section 3 we provide the following results: If a
litigant has significant information about the state beyond what can be disclosed as hard
5Daughety and Reinganum (2000a) use an axiomatic method to study the processing of information by
trial courts in a model in which evidence is the result of strategic search and the court observes only that
evidence presented by the litigants. Daughety and Reinganum (2000b) study bias, in an axiomatic approach
with a strategic search model of evidence, due to differences in the litigant’s sampling cost or sampling
distribution.
6Milgrom (1981) and Shin (1994) are classic examples. Che and Severinov (2017) focus on the role
for attorneys to suppress evidence in a model in which litigants probabilistically possess evidence and an
additional judgment-relevant piece of information is observed by attorneys and the court. Both of these are
from a continuum and satisfy a monotone likelihood ratio property. They find that attorneys are helpful in
that they can suppress favorable evidence in equilibria with play of weakly-dominated strategies.
7Bull and Watson (2004 and 2007), Green and Laffont (1986), and Kartik and Tercieux (2012) are
examples of this category. Bull (2012) studies a model in which a piece of evidence can exist both when an
accused is guilty and when he is innocent, but this focuses on the different issues of police interrogation and
incentives for evidence fabrication.
8See Watson (1996) for an early version of this type of model. Those models typically assume that
the sender and receiver have shared prior information. Hedlund (2017) studies Bayesian persuasion with a
privately-informed sender.
9In real settings, parties also may invest resources to gather evidence. We do not consider this strategic
variable in the present paper.
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evidence, then there is a problem of coordination of beliefs and behavior between the litigant
and the jury, and hard evidence is misleading in some rationalizable outcomes. Further, the
potential welfare loss of misleading evidence exceeds the potential gain of the face-value
signal. In contrast, if a litigant’s private information adds little to what can be disclosed
as hard evidence, then there is a unique rationalizable outcome and, in a setting in which
the document is positive evidence of the litigant’s favored state, the litigant discloses the
document whenever it exists. In this case we say that hard evidence is effective.
Section 4 briefly discusses implications of the basic model for the courts. For the sake of
robust usage of hard evidence in litigation, under some conditions it is optimal for the court
to make the document inadmissible. This is essentially an exercise in mechanism design,
where the objective is to implement a mapping from the realized evidence to the judgment,
but we restrict ourselves to the nearly trivial but realistic design element of whether to allow
the single document to be admitted into evidence.
In Section 5 we extend our model to the case of two documents, which allows for an
analysis of a wider range of evidentiary rules than in the basic model. For instance, the
court can make a single document inadmissible but allow the two documents to be disclosed
together. We show that such a rule is optimal for robustness in settings where the face-value
signal of a single document is relatively weak and yet the face-value signal of two documents
is strong. A complication in the analysis is that disclosure of a single document may serve as
both a signal of the litigant’s private information and a signal of whether the other document
exists.
A discussion of how our model and results relate to the law, including examples based
on some well-known cases, is contained in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7. Proofs of
the theorems may be found in the Appendix.
2 Basic Model
2.1 Description of the Game
We study a simple two-player game with hard evidence. The first player has information
about an underlying state of the world and may be able to disclose hard evidence about it.
The second player observes whatever evidence is presented and then takes an action that
affects both players. The model portrays litigation in court, where the first player is a litigant
(plaintiff or defendant) and the second player is the fact-finder (typically a jury).10 To keep
10The model has applications outside of the legal realm but we focus on the legal application here.
7
things simple, we call the players the “litigant” and “jury,” and we think of the jury as a
single agent. The jury and society care about the state and also about the jury’s decision,
which in practical terms is a finding in the case. Let θ denote the state and suppose that
θ ∈ Θ ≡ {0, 1}. We will speak of θ = 0 as the “low state” and θ = 1 as the “high state.”
Later we shall round out our description of the court by including a judge in the story.
Whereas the jury does not observe the state, the litigant has two sources of information
about it. First, the litigant privately observes an unverifiable signal x ∈ X, where X is some
arbitrary finite set. We occasionally refer to this signal as the litigant’s “x-type.” Second,
the litigant may obtain hard evidence, which is verifiable and can be disclosed to the jury.
Suppose hard evidence takes the following binary form: The litigant may or may not possess
a single document d. We represent the hard evidence that the litigant possesses by the
evidentiary state e ∈ E ≡ {d, ∅}, where e = d means the litigant possesses the document
(and we say “the document exists”) and e = ∅ means that the litigant does not possess the
document (“the document does not exist”). If e = d then the litigant can choose to either
disclose the document or disclose nothing. If e = ∅, then he must disclose nothing; this is
the defining characteristic of hard evidence. We sometimes describe disclosing nothing as
“disclosing ∅.” The jury observes only whether d is disclosed, not whether d exists. That is,
the jury does not observe e.
The underlying state θ, the evidentiary state e, and the private signal x are determined
exogenously by nature and in general are correlated.11 Let f denote the joint distribution, so
that f(θ, e, x) is the probability that (θ, e, x) is realized. Defining f over sets, we also write
expressions such as f(θ, e,K) for K ⊂ X, which is the probability that the underlying state
is θ, the evidentiary state is e, and the private signal is an element of K. Let r ≡ f(1, E,X)
be the marginal probability that the underlying state is high and assume that r ∈ (0, 1). It
will sometimes be useful to write the probability of e and x conditional on θ, which is given
by the standard conditional-probability formula:
f(e, x | θ) ≡ f(θ, e, x)
f(θ, E,X)
.
We shall assume that f(Θ, d,X) ∈ (0, 1) and that f(Θ, d, x) > 0 for all x ∈ X.
Consider the face-value signal of the hard evidence, which is the marginal signal provided
by the existence or nonexistence of the document, averaging over the litigant’s private signal
x. If f(d,X | 1) > f(d,X | 0) then we say that the document is positive evidence of the
11While it would be appropriate to call the entire vector (θ, e, x) the state (with no qualifier “underlying”
or “evidentiary”), we sometimes call θ the state because this is what is of direct interest to the jury.
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high state and the absence of the document is negative evidence of the low state (Bull and
Watson, 2004). If f(d,X |1) < f(d,X |0) then we say the opposite—the document is positive
evidence of the low state. Extreme cases of absolute proof are given by f(d,X | 1) = 1 and
f(d,X | 0) = 0, where disclosure of d proves that the state is high, and f(d,X | 1) = 0 and
f(d,X |0) = 1, where disclosure of d proves that the state is low.12
The inference that the jury can draw from the litigant’s disclosure (or lack of disclosure)
depends not only on the properties of the document but also on the incentives of the litigant
to disclose it, and the litigant’s behavior may be conditioned on his private signal x. There-
fore, any inference to be made from the disclosure or nondisclosure should incorporate both
that the document cannot be disclosed if it does not exist—this is the direct information
from hard evidence—and how x influences the decision to disclose, which we refer to as the
soft signaling role.
After seeing whether the litigant discloses d, the jury updates its belief about the un-
derlying state and selects its action. To keep things simple, suppose that the jury’s action
is a selection a ∈ [0, 1] representing, for instance, the degree to which the litigant is held
responsible for a crime or the amount of monetary damages to award the litigant. Assume
that the jury’s (and society’s) payoff is decreasing in the square of the difference between
the action a and the state θ, so the jury’s payoff is uJ(a, θ) = −(a − θ)2. This implies that
the jury’s optimal action is equal to its posterior probability of the high state.
Assume that the litigant’s payoff is strictly increasing in the jury’s expected action,
regardless of the underlying state. The simplest such payoff function is uL(a, θ) = a. It is
thus in the litigant’s interest to act in whatever fashion will maximize the jury’s posterior
probability of θ = 1.13 More generally, we could allow uL to be a function of the state or
even of the litigant’s private signal and realization of hard evidence, but this will not be
necessary for the logical connections that we focus on.
For most of our analysis, we will not need to examine the jury’s action directly. Rather,
we can formulate the analysis in terms of the jury’s posterior belief. We assume that the jury
is Bayesian in that its posterior belief results from a proper application of the conditional
probability formula, given the jury’s belief about the litigant’s strategy. For now, we also
12Another extreme has f(d,X | 1) = f(d,X | 0) = 1, which is the case of a cheap document, but the
assumptions made already rule this out.
13Another setting that leads to the same analysis and results is one in which the jury has only two actions
available, such as finding the litigant guilty or not guilty, and the jury prefers or is instructed to choose not
guilty in the high state and guilty in the low state. However, in addition to the information received from
the litigant’s evidence choice, the jury is influenced by a separate, independent noisy information source.
Therefore, the jury’s judgment is random and increasing in the posterior conditional on the litigant’s evidence
choice.
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assume that the court cannot force the jury to commit to a decision rule in advance of the
litigant’s disclosure choice.
Assume that the foregoing description is common knowledge between the players. To
recap, in this incomplete-information game, an exogenous random draw determines (θ, e, x).
The litigant obtains e and also observes x. Then, if e = d, the litigant decides whether to
disclose d. Finally, the jury observes whether d is disclosed, forms its posterior belief about
the state θ, and selects its action a.
2.2 A Note on Litigant Types and Primary Activity
Our model describes a strategic situation between a litigant and jury, conditional on the
case being in court. To analyze a real-world application, it can be helpful to describe how
events that would lead to a court case imply the distribution f . Developing the context, we
see that different types of litigant in our model can actually be different people in the real
world. For instance, consider the following simple story about the events leading to a court
case.
There is a variety of individuals in society and they may differ in their propensity to
commit a crime and, if so, how to go about it. Their behavior and some exogenous random
forces lead to an outcome of preliminary activity, which includes whether and how a crime is
committed, evidence relevant to the crime, and the detainment by the police of an individual
who is brought to trial. It is possible that this defendant—the litigant in our model—
is a legitimate suspect but actually did not commit the crime, just as it is possible that
the defendant did in fact commit the crime. These two types of defendant are different
people in the society and their personal backgrounds are, to the extent not observable to
law enforcement, captured in the x variable.
If the question before the jury is whether the defendant’s culpability exceeds a partic-
ular evidentiary standard, and if the defendant has some understanding about whether he
performed a criminal act, then a component of x is correlated with θ but is not necessarily
perfectly correlated.14 That is, the defendant may have information about whether he is
culpable but not know precisely whether his behavior exceeds the cutoff for a guilty verdict
or for a particular sentence. If, in this example, the defendant knows precisely whether he or
she committed the crime and this is the question that the jury considers, then a component
of x would be perfectly correlated with θ.
Consideration of the social backdrop also demonstrates how natural it is for there to be
14The litigant may lack an understanding of the law or is unsure of whether his behavior was criminal.
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correlation between e and x, conditional on the underlying state θ. Take the store robbery
example in the Introduction and suppose d denotes the litigant (defendant) being on the
recording of the stadium security camera at a time that would make it challenging for him
to have traveled to the store and committed the robbery. Suppose that X is partitioned
into four subsets representing four different groups of people in the society: I, I ′, G, and
G′. Types in I and I ′ would never commit a criminal act and those in I happen to be on
the stadium video, types in G are sophisticated criminals who plan to make an appearance
in front of the camera at the stadium before racing to the store to commit the crime, and
types in G′ are naive criminals who would commit the crime on the spur of the moment and
would not be on the stadium video. Assume that x is randomly drawn, the crime occurs
if x ∈ G ∪ G′, and there is some randomness in police work so that with some probability
an innocent person is the one brought to trial. Then, along with the x already defined, we
have θ = 1 if x ∈ I ∪ I ′ and θ = 0 otherwise. The video evidence exists, so that e = d, if
x ∈ I ∪G. The distribution f is then defined from the distribution of x and the randomness
induced by the police work to identify a suspect, conditional on a crime occurring. In this
example, x and e are correlated overall and they are correlated conditional on θ.
2.3 Strategies and Beliefs
A pure strategy for the litigant is a function mapping X to the choice of whether to disclose,
in the event that e = d.15 A mixed (behavior) strategy for the litigant is given by a function
σ :X → [0, 1], where for each x ∈ X, σ(x) is the probability that the litigant discloses the
document in the event that e = d and his private signal is x. “Full disclosure” refers to the
strategy that always discloses the document, so σ(x) = 1 for every x ∈ X.
To enrich the model a bit, we will assume that the litigant’s disclosure probabilities are
bounded below by a number ψ ∈ [0, 1]. That is, the litigant is constrained to choose σ(x) ≥ ψ
for every x. This lower bound captures the idea that the litigant may be influenced by a
lawyer or other party who induces the litigant to disclose available hard evidence, or that the
document is automatically disclosed with some probability. We make no assumption about
ψ, so ψ = 0 is allowed and in this case the litigant is unconstrained.
The jury’s posterior belief regarding the state is conditioned on whether the document
is disclosed. Let b(d) denote the posterior probability of the high state in the event that d is
disclosed and let b(∅) be the probability of the high state in the event that d is not disclosed.
These values define the jury’s interpretation of hard evidence.
15Recall that the litigant has no choice in the event that e = ∅.
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It is important to recognize that b(d) and b(∅) depend on the jury’s belief about the
litigant’s strategy, as well as the jury’s understanding of the information system. Likewise,
the litigant’s optimal strategy depends on the litigant’s belief about the jury’s updating rule.
Let b(d) denote the mean of the litigant’s belief about b(d), and let b(∅) denote the mean of
the litigant’s belief about b(∅).
In the event that the document exists, it is clearly optimal for the litigant to disclose it
if b(d) > b(∅) and to not disclose if b(d) < b(∅). The litigant is indifferent if b(d) = b(∅).
These incentives do not depend on the litigant’s private signal x because the litigant cares
only about increasing the jury’s posterior belief, which is a function of evidence only.
Let us represent the jury’s belief about the litigant’s strategy as a function λ :X → [0, 1],
where for each x ∈ X, λ(x) is the probability that the jury thinks the litigant discloses the
document in the event that e = d and the litigant’s private signal is x. We can determine
the jury’s posterior beliefs in terms of λ and the fundamentals of the model. Note that
f(1, e, x) = rf(e, x | 1) and f(0, e, x) = (1 − r)f(e, x | 0). If ∑x∈X f(Θ, d, x)λ(x) > 0, then
the jury’s posterior belief conditional on disclosure is given by Bayes’ rule:
b(d) =
∑
x∈X rf(d, x |1)λ(x)∑
x∈X [rf(d, x |1) + (1− r)f(d, x |0)]λ(x)
(1)
Likewise, the Bayes’ rule expression for the jury’s posterior belief conditional on nondisclosure
is:
b(∅) = r
[
1−∑x∈X f(d, x |1)λ(x)]
r
[
1−∑x∈X f(d, x |1)λ(x)]+ (1− r) [1−∑x∈X f(d, x |0)λ(x)] , (2)
where the denominator is always strictly positive because of our assumption that the doc-
ument exists with a probability strictly less than one. However, the denominator in the
equation for b(d) is zero if the jury’s initial belief about the litigant is λ(x) = 0 for all x,
and in this case the expression is not valid (Bayes’ rule overall does not apply). The so-
lution concepts we study impose constraints on the jury’s belief in such a situation, as we
demonstrate in the next subsection.
2.4 Solution Concept, Welfare, and Admissibility
We shall analyze the game using mainly the solution concept of rationalizability, which
assumes it is common knowledge that the players form beliefs about each other and best
respond to their beliefs. The set of rationalizable strategy profiles contains all of the profiles
consistent with this assumption. For instance, the jury will not put positive probability on
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a strategy for the litigant that itself cannot be rationalized. Importantly, in a rationalizable
outcome it is not necessarily the case that one player’s beliefs are accurate about the other
player’s beliefs and behavior. Depending on parameters, there may be a rationalizable
outcome in which the litigant has an incorrect belief about the jury’s reasoning, or vice versa,
so that b(d) 6= b(d) and b(∅) 6= b(∅). We shall adopt a version of rationalizability in which
the players’ beliefs are assumed to be plainly consistent (Watson 2015); the implications and
motivation are discussed below.
The rationalizability concept is appropriate for settings in which the litigant and jury lack
experience in dealing with each other, and where the legal institution and social norms would
not be expected to completely coordinate the litigant’s and jury’s beliefs and behavior. For
example, a significant fraction of civil and criminal cases feature a litigant who has had little
previous experience in court and who has not faced the same circumstances before. Most
jurors also have limited experience in fact-finding. These players may be able to engage in
sophisticated reasoning and understand each other’s incentives and rationality, but still not
be fully coordinated.16
With the rationalizability concept, our model does not require the beliefs of different
types of litigant to be the same. Indeed, we think it is important to allow for non-aligned
types, whereby the litigant’s beliefs may depend on his private signal and hard evidence. The
main justification for this is that, as noted already, the various litigant x-types typically refer
to different people in a population, and there is no reason to believe that different people
have exactly the same beliefs. Non-aligned types will play an important role in our theory.
In our model, plain consistency puts some structure on the jury’s beliefs. It implies
the standard use of Bayes’ rule to calculate the posteriors b(d) and b(∅) if the jury initially
put positive probability on disclosure. That is, if λ gives the jury’s initial belief about the
litigant’s strategy, then Equations 1 and 2 hold if the denominators are strictly positive. In
fact, plain consistency further implies that the posterior beliefs have this structure even in
the case in which the jury initially put zero probability on the document being disclosed.
Theorem 1: The following holds for every belief system satisfying plain consistency. The
jury’s posterior belief b(∅) satisfies Equation 2, where λ is the jury’s initial belief about the
16In the Appendix we also look at the stronger solution concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE),
which for our model is equivalent to sequential equilibrium. In a PBE, the players are rational and their
beliefs and behavior are aligned, so that b(d) = b(d), b(∅) = b(∅), and λ = σ. Furthermore, the players’
beliefs satisfy plain consistency (See Watson 2015). The main reason to look at PBE is that it provides
intuition for the rationalizability construction. It also may be an appropriate solution concept for settings
in which the legal institution or some other institution serves to align beliefs and behavior. We discuss later
the role of transparency and interpretive guidance in the legal system.
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litigant’s strategy. The jury’s posterior belief b(d) satisfies Equation 1, where λ is the jury’s
initial belief about the litigant’s strategy if it satisfies
∑
x∈X f(Θ, d, x)λ(x) > 0 and otherwise
λ is an arbitrary updated belief about the litigant’s strategy.17
Social welfare is measured by the jury’s actual payoff. We will take the expectation
with respect to the distribution f , calling this the expected actual payoff of the jury. Note
that this may differ from the jury’s expected payoff—that is, the expected payoff in the
mind of the jury—because what the jury expects and what actually happens may differ in
a rationalizable outcome.
There are two key elements of welfare analysis. First, we want to identify whether hard
evidence is useful in the litigation process, in terms of raising the jury’s actual payoff, and
we want to quantify the extent to which hard evidence can function in a misleading way
that lowers welfare. Second, we investigate the design of admissibility rules with a goal of
robust litigation, which is to find rules that ensure hard evidence plays a constructive role
in the litigation process.
On the welfare front, we use the following notation. Let U∗J denote the jury’s expected
payoff in an artificial setting in which the jury directly observes whether the document
exists (but does not observe x), forms the proper posterior belief, and best responds. Let U0J
denote the jury’s expected payoff in an artificial setting without hard evidence, where the
jury must choose a without interacting with the litigant. Then U∗J − U0J is the face value of
hard evidence, in other words the welfare gain due to the face-value signal provided by hard
evidence.18
Let us say that hard evidence is (partially or completely) ineffective if the litigant plays
a strategy other than full disclosure, because in such a case the jury does not always see the
document when it exists and therefore is unable to benefit fully from its face-value signal.
We’ll say that hard evidence is useless if the litigant never discloses it. Further, let bσ(d)
and bσ(∅) be the posterior probabilities from Equations 1 and 2 under the assumption that
λ = σ, where we recognize that the former is defined only if σ(x) > 0 for some x satisfying
f(Θ, d, x) > 0. These would be the jury’s posterior beliefs if the jury knew the litigant’s
actual strategy. Then we say that hard evidence is misleading if bσ(d) is well defined and
yet b(d) 6= bσ(d), and/or b(∅) 6= bσ(∅). That is, the jury’s posterior beliefs are not consistent
17This means that the beliefs are structurally consistent (Kreps and Ramey 1987).
18Let b∗(d) = f(1,d,X)f(Θ,d,X) and b
∗(∅) = f(1,∅,X)f(Θ,∅,X) be the updated probabilities of the underlying state conditional
on e = d and e = ∅. Then, because the jury optimally sets a equal to the posterior probability of the high
underlying state, we have U∗J = −f(1, d,X) (b∗(d)− 1)2 − f(0, d,X) (b∗(d)− 0)2 − f(1, ∅, X) (b∗(∅)− 1)2 −
f(0, ∅, X) (b∗(∅)− 0)2 and U0J = −r(r − 1)2 − (1− r)(r − 0)2.
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with the litigant’s actual strategy.
Finally, let UJ denote the lowest expected actual payoff of the jury over the rationalizable
outcomes of our litigation game, so that U∗J − UJ is the potential welfare loss due to hard
evidence being ineffective or misleading. The potential loss ratio is defined to be the ratio
L =
U∗J − UJ
U∗J − U0J
.
Note that L ≥ 0. If we replace UJ with the jury’s expected actual payoff, then L becomes
the actual loss ratio. We will find that rationalizable outcomes under some conditions lead
to values of L strictly greater than 1, which means that hard evidence can be so misleading
as to more than offset the potential welfare gain that its face-value signal can provide.19
The second key element of the welfare analysis is to investigate the design of admissibility
rules with a goal of robust litigation, which is to find rules that ensure hard evidence plays a
constructive role in the litigation process. Consistent with the notion of robust mechanism
design, our objective for robustness is to maximize the minimum rationalizable expected
actual payoff of the jury. The optimization exercise is by the law’s choice of admissibility
rule. In the basic model, an admissibility rule simply declares whether the single document
is admissible, and clearly the social objective requires making the document inadmissible if
L > 1. If it is not admissible, then the litigation game becomes a restricted game in which
the litigant can never disclose, and so the litigant has no action. In the two-document model
analyzed later in this paper, there are several feasible levels of admissibility.
3 Conditions For Misleading Hard Evidence
Whether hard evidence can turn out to be ineffective or misleading depends critically on
the strength of the litigant’s private signal relative to the strength of the hard evidence. To
explore the connection, let us examine the possibilities for b(d). Define:
K+ ≡ {x ∈ X |f(d, x |1) ≥ f(d, x |0)} and K− ≡ {x ∈ X |f(d, x |1) < f(d, x |0)}.
Thus, K+ is the set of litigant x-types for which the combination of the occurance of x and
existence of the document is positive evidence of θ = 1, whereas K− is the set of litigant x-
types for which the combination of the occurance of the type and existence of the document
19In an equilibrium of our litigation game, the actual loss ratio would always be in the interval [0, 1].
Incidentally, there can be rationalizable outcomes of the litigation game that give the jury an expected
actual payoff in excess of U∗J , which means that ineffective evidence provides a welfare gain.
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is positive evidence of θ = 0. Note that X = K+ ∪K−. The key conditions compare these
combination signals to the face-value signal of the hard evidence d.
Lemma 1: Let b(d) be given by Equation 1. There is a function λ :X → [0, 1] satisfying
λ(x) ≥ ψ for every x ∈ X, and such that b(d) < r, if and only if
ψ [f(d,X |1)− f(d,X |0)] < [f(d,K− |0)− f(d,K− |1)] . (3)
Likewise, there is a function λ :X → [0, 1] satisfying λ(x) ≥ ψ for every x ∈ X, and such
that b(d) > r, if and only if
ψ [f(d,X |1)− f(d,X |0)] > [f(d,K+ |0)− f(d,K+ |1)] . (4)
Proof: We write b(d) < r using Equation 1 to substitute for b(d), and then rewrite the
expression using f(d, x |θ)λ(x) = f(d, x |θ)ψ + f(d, x |θ)(λ(x)− ψ). Factoring and dividing
by (1− r), we obtain the following inequality:
ψ [f(d,X |1)− f(d,X |0)] <
∑
x∈X
[f(d, x |0)− f(d, x |1)] (λ(x)− ψ) . (5)
Because λ(x) ≥ ψ is required, the right side is maximized by setting λ(x) = 1 for all
x ∈ K− and λ(x) = ψ for all x ∈ K+, which yields the conclusion for Inequality 3. In
words, the jury believes that the litigant would disclose the document for sure if x ∈ K−
and otherwise would disclose the document with just the minimal probability ψ. This leads
the jury to update the state downward following disclosure, and so b(d) < r. A further
implication is that b(∅) ≥ r, whatever is the jury’s initial belief about the litigant’s strategy.20
The relation b(d) > r is equivalent to the reverse of Inequality 5, and so we want to
minimize the right side. This is accomplished by setting λ(x) = 1 for all x ∈ K+ and
λ(x) = ψ for all x ∈ K−, which yields the conclusion for Inequality 4. Here the jury believes
that x-types in K+ would disclose for sure and the others would disclose only minimally, so
that disclosure induces the jury to update downward. 
If f(d,X | 1) < f(d,X | 0) then Inequality 3 trivially holds. This is the case in which
the document is positive evidence of the low state overall, so the face-value signal of hard
20If the jury’s initial belief λ implies strictly positive probability of both disclosure and non-disclosure, then
b(d) is calculated using this function λ, and b(d) < r implies b(∅) > r by the law of iterated expectations.
If the jury’s initial belief satisfies λ(x) = 0 for all x, then b(∅) = r because non-disclosure conveys no
information.
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evidence favors the low state. If the face-value signal of hard evidence favors the high state,
then Inequality 3 requires K− to be nonempty, so that there are x-types that, in combination
with existence of the document, provide positive evidence of the low state. Further, the
magnitude of this positive evidence of the low state is required to exceed the magnitude of
the document’s face-value signal as positive evidence of the high state, by an amount that is
high enough in relation to ψ. Likewise, if f(d,X |1) > f(d,X |0) then Inequality 4 trivially
holds. Otherwise, Inequality 4 requires x-types that, in combination with the document
existing, provide sufficiently strong positive evidence of the high state.
It is not difficult to verify that Inequalities 3 and 4 are both satisfied if the litigant’s private
signal provides a sufficiently accurate indication of the underlying state, if ψ is sufficiently
small, and if the document exists with strictly positive probability in both underlying states.
Suppose, for instance, that the litigant precisely knows the state; in the example of a criminal
trial, this would mean that the defendant knows perfectly whether his culpability exceeds
the threshold for guilt. Then K+ is the set of x-types that know the state is high and K− are
the x-types that know the state is low, so f(d,K+ |1) > 0, f(d,K+ |0) = 0, f(d,K− |0) > 0,
and f(d,K− | 1) = 0. Then Inequalities 3 and 4 trivially follow for a small enough value
of ψ. This is an extreme example. Real litigants would generally not know the underlying
state perfectly because of uncertainty regarding standards of proof and the law.
It is precisely when Inequalities 3 and 4 are both satisfied that there are rationalizable
outcomes in which hard evidence is misleading. The root cause is miscoordination between
the players’ beliefs and behavior. Realistically, different x-types may have different beliefs
about the jury’s reasoning and interpretation. Consider, for example, the setting in which
the litigant is a defendant who knows his culpability and suppose that a guilty litigant (with
x ∈ K−) believes the jury will look favorably on disclosure of the document, so that this
x-type’s beliefs satisfy b(d) > b(∅). Suppose that the beliefs of an innocent litigant (with
x ∈ K+) are opposite: b(d) < b(∅). Both kinds of beliefs are rational because they are
consistent with feasible beliefs and proper updating by the jury. These beliefs would lead
the guilty litigant to disclose the document and the innocent litigant to not disclose. Further
suppose that the jury believes that the innocent x-type would disclose and the guilty x-type
would not disclose. Then the jury gets the hard evidence signal backward and evidence is
misleading. Importantly, every x-type of litigant and the jury are behaving rationally and
fully incorporate the rationality of the other player-types, so the outcome is rationalizable.
Lemma 1 then leads to the conditions for misleading or ineffective hard evidence, which
are summarized as follows.
17
Theorem 2: If Inequality 3 holds and Inequality 4 is reversed, then the unique rationalizable
outcome has the litigant disclosing d always at minimum probability ψ, the actual loss ratio
is L ∈ (0, 1], and hard evidence is ineffective. If Inequality 3 is reversed and Inequality 4
holds, then the unique rationalizable outcome has the litigant disclosing d whenever he has
it, the actual loss ratio is L = 0, and hard evidence is effective. If Inequalities 3 and 4 are
both satisfied, then there are rationalizable outcomes in which hard evidence is misleading
and the potential loss ratio is L > 1.
We call the second case, where the actual loss ratio is L = 0 and hard evidence is effective,
the condition of robust litigation, because it is in this case that rational behavior always
leads to effective hard evidence. Incidentally, although rationalizability assumes common
knowledge of rational behavior, our result follows from only that players are rational (best
responding to their beliefs) and know this about each other.
To interpret the third case described in Theorem 2, it is useful to consider equilibrium
outcomes as a benchmark. We can divide the third case into two subcases on the basis
of whether f(d,X | 1) ≤ f(d,X | 0). If this inequality holds, then every perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the litigation game is uninformative, meaning that hard evidence is completely
ineffective. If f(d,X | 1) > f(d,X | 0), then there are multiple perfect Bayesian equilibria,
including ones in which the document is never disclosed (so hard evidence is completely
ineffective) and one in which the document is always disclosed (so hard evidence is effective).
It is easy to verify that the loss level in any equilibrium is between 0 and 1. But in both
subcases, there are rationalizable outcomes in which hard evidence is misleading and the
loss level strictly exceeds 1, so welfare falls strictly below what could be achieved in any
equilibrium.
The equilibrium benchmark also is helpful in motivating the rationalizability concept and,
in particular, the prospect of miscoordinated beliefs and behavior. Suppose that f(d,X |
1) > f(d,X | 0). Then the various types of litigant and the jury could all believe that they
are playing a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the litigation game, but they may not have the
same equilibrium in mind. For instance, one type of litigant may behave according to an
equilibrium in which the document is never disclosed, while another behaves according to
an equilibrium in which the document is always disclosed. Whatever equilibrium the jury
thinks is being played, evidence will turn out to be misleading.
To see how the prospect of misleading evidence depends on the relation between the
informativeness of the litigant’s private signal and the face-value signal of hard evidence,
consider the case in which e and x are conditionally independent and ψ = 0. Let qθ denote
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the probability that e = d conditional on θ, and let pθ(x) denote the probability that the
litigant’s private signal is x conditional on θ. Thus f(d, x |θ) = qθpθ(x) and qθ = f(d,X |θ).
Define:
γ ≡ max
x∈X
p0(x)
p1(x)
and γ ≡ min
x∈X
p0(x)
p1(x)
.
These are the maximum and minimum of the likelihood ratio (low state to high state) over
the private signal values of the litigant. They provide bounds on the highest and lowest
posterior probability that the litigant can have about the low state based only on his private
signal. Because p0(X) = p1(X) = 1, we know that γ ≤ 1 ≤ γ.
For the conditionally independent case, we can state our previous results as follows.
Corollary 1: Suppose that ψ = 0 and hard evidence e and private signal x are independent
conditional on the underlying state θ. If q1/q0 < γ, then the unique rationalizable outcome
has the litigant never disclosing d, the actual loss ratio is L = 1, and hard evidence is
completely ineffective. If γ < q1/q0 then the unique rationalizable outcome has the litigant
disclosing d whenever he has it, the actual loss ratio is L = 0, and hard evidence is effective.
If γ ≤ q1/q0 ≤ γ then there are rationalizable outcomes in which hard evidence is misleading
and the potential loss ratio is L > 1.
Thus, when the face-value signal of hard evidence is strong relative to the litigant’s
private signal, there is no concern of misleading evidence. If in addition the document is
positive evidence of the high state (which the litigant prefers), then hard evidence is effective.
However, when the information provided by the private signal is strong relative to the face-
value signal of hard evidence, then there is scope for the evidence to be misleading and the
prospect of the welfare loss exceeding the potential welfare gain of the face-value signal.
4 Implications for Courts
Are the prospects for misleading or useless evidence a problem for the legal system to solve?
Is robustness an appreciable problem? To both questions, our answer is affirmative. Actual
litigants and juries typically arrive in court with little experience with similar settings and
with each other, and so, lacking an institution that would coordinate them, there is little
reason to expect that their beliefs and behavior would be aligned.21 Even if some measure
of coordination could be achieved, theory does not provide much hope that the parties will
21In fact, the jury-selection process typically ensures that jurors have not had prior interaction with the
litigants.
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coordinate on society’s preferred outcome. For instance, standard equilibrium refinements
do not restrict the equilibrium much less select the most informative equilibrium.22
Viewing the robustness problem as something the legal system ought to help solve, three
remedies come to mind and all have some bearing on reality. The first is for the court to be
transparent regarding its interpretive rules, meaning that the court should strive to articulate
standards for how some common evidentiary actions should be interpreted. This may help
to align the beliefs of the various litigant x-types and also put them into alignment with
the jury’s beliefs. However, projecting complete transparency will typically be impossible
because of the great many contingencies that the court would have to explain before litigation
commences in a given case.23 Further, such an intervention assumes that the court fully
understands the background of each case and has the jury’s knowledge about the statistical
details of evidence, which voids the function of the jury as fact-finder.
The second remedy is for the court to impose rules that reduce the litigant’s discretion
regarding whether to disclose hard evidence. For example, the court may penalize a litigant
who failed to disclose evidence that was later found to exist, as is the case with prosecutors
and the Brady rule in the United States. In terms of the model, this would have the effect
of raising the parameter ψ which, from Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, reduces the range of other
parameters under which evidence may be misleading in the case of positive evidence of the
high state.
The third remedy is a more familiar and forceful instrument: admissibility rules. The
law can provide simple rules that identify conditions under which the court should allow
evidence to be admitted. The rules must be in a form that the court can readily apply, so
they should be a function of the parameters of the evidentiary system. They state whether a
given document (to use our model’s terminology) is admissible, which can be represented in
our model as whether the litigant is allowed to disclose the document.24 The determination
is made on the basis of relevance, which refers to the likelihood parameters in our model.
Let us therefore assume that the policy instruments available to the framers of the law
are admissibility rules and that, otherwise, the court does not interfere with the jury’s
22The intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps 1987) has no bite in the basic model. The divinity criterion
(Banks and Sobel 1987) has no bite in the slightly more general model in which the litigant’s preferences
can depend slightly on the state and there is a small cost of disclosure; for instance, the litigant’s marginal
value of the court’s action is slightly higher in the low state than in the high state.
23Common legal representation for various litigant x-types—as would be the case with specialist
attorneys—may serve to align the beliefs of the various x-types.
24Admissibility rules may operate in two ways. The court could simply refuse to allow certain documents
to be presented. Alternatively, the court could declare that the jury treat specific disclosures (or lack thereof)
as though providing no information whatsoever.
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Bayesian analysis. We look for admissibility rules that represent society’s interest in avoiding
misleading evidence and associated welfare loss. Suppose that the court seeks robustness in
the litigation process, which we have defined to mean maximizing the minimal social welfare
over all rationalizable outcomes of our litigation game. Then the court optimally makes the
document d inadmissible if and only if L > 1, because in this case the potential welfare loss
exceeds the gain of the document’s face-value signal.
Policy Implication 1: To ensure robust use of evidence in litigation, the court sometimes
must make some hard evidence inadmissible, in particular when the potential welfare loss
outweighs the face-value signal.
Because misleading evidence is the product of miscoordinated beliefs, and one would not
expect the parties’ to always be miscoordinated, society would generally tolerate some level
of potential loss above hard evidence’s face value. Effective use of evidence in the litigation
process relates to lowering L, so it is worth determining how changes in parameter values
affect L. Unfortunately, calculating the potential loss is difficult and we cannot provide a
clean comparative-statics result. However, one can uncover a property of L for parameter
values near the cutoff for robust litigation, and the news is not so good. Specifically, for
parameters close to the region of robust litigation, the potential loss ratio is bounded away
from 1.
Theorem 3: Suppose that hard evidence e and private signal x are independent conditional
on the underlying state θ, ψ = 0, and γ < γ. Let q1 be bounded away from 0 by a fixed
number. Then there is a number L > 1 so that, for all q1 and q2 satisfying γ ≤ q1/q0 ≤ γ,
the potential loss ratio satisfies L ≥ L.
5 A Setting with Multiple Documents
Extending the model to include multiple documents adds another layer of possible inference,
as disclosure of one document or a set of documents could be interpreted as providing
information about the existence or nonexistence of documents that were not disclosed. In
this section we consider a setting with two documents and we explore the implications
of restricting the litigant’s disclosure options. We show that, for some parameter values,
requiring the litigant to bundle documents leads to robust litigation whereas litigation is not
robust without this constraint.
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Consider an extension of our model with documents d1 and d2. There are four evidentiary
states, which we represent in terms of subsets of documents: E = {∅, {d1}, {d2}, {d1, d2}},
where e = ∅ means no documents exist, e = {dk} means only document dk exists (k = 1
or k = 2), and e = {d1, d2} means documents d1 and d2 both exist. The litigant is able to
disclose only documents that exist; for instance, in the event that e = {d1}, the litigant can
only disclose d1 or disclose nothing. Thus, in evidentiary state e, the litigant can select any
e′ ⊂ e to disclose. In some expressions, instead of writing “e = {dk}” and “e = {d1, d2},” we
will write “e = dk” and “e = d1d2” for convenience.
Let us assume, for simplicity, that existence of the documents and the realization of the
litigant’s private signal x are all conditionally independent given the state θ. Further assume
that ψ = 0. Let pθ(x) be the probability that the private signal is x given the state θ, let q1θ
be the probability that d1 exists given θ, and let q2θ be the probability that d2 exists given
θ. Then, for instance, we have f(d1, x |θ) = q1θ(1− q2θ)p1(x) and f(d1d2, x |θ) = q1θq2θp1(x).
We shall focus on the setting in which the two documents are positive evidence of the high
state, so throughout this section we maintain the assumption that q11 > q10 and q21 > q20.
Let λe′(x, e) be the probability that the jury assigns to the litigant disclosing e
′ ⊂ e in
the event that the evidentiary state is e and the litigant’s private signal is x. The jury’s
posterior belief about the state conditional on disclosure of e′, which we denote b(e′), is given
by:
b(e′) =
∑
x∈X, e⊃e′
rf(e, x |1)λe′(x, e)∑
x∈X, e⊃e′
rf(e, x |1)λe′(x, e) +
∑
x∈X, e⊃e′
(1− r)f(e, x |0)λe′(x, e)
. (6)
Here λ is the jury’s initial belief about the litigant’s strategy or, in the case that this belief
makes the denominator zero, λ is an arbitrary updated belief (as plain consistency requires).
As before, let σ denote the litigant’s strategy. For each evidentiary state e ∈ E, every
private signal x ∈ X, and each e′ ⊂ e, we define σe′(x, e) to be the probability that the
litigant discloses e′ when he possesses evidence e and receives private signal x. We use the
term “full disclosure” to describe the litigant’s strategy that always discloses every existing
document. Let bσ(e′) be the posterior probability from Equation 6 under the assumption
that λ = σ, where we recognize that this is defined only if σe′(x, e) > 0 for some x and
e satisfying f(Θ, e, x) > 0. The notions of misleading hard evidence and effective hard
evidence carry over from the basic model. For instance, hard evidence is misleading if there
exists a disclosure e′ ∈ E such that bσ(e′) is well defined and yet b(e′) 6= bσ(e′).
We generalize the definitions of potential and actual loss ratios here, to allow various
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comparisons with regard to restrictions on the submission of evidence. Let δ denote a
disclosure policy, which specifies the sets of documents that are allowed to be disclosed,
with the empty set assumed to be included. For instance, one possible policy is δBundle =
{∅, {d1, d2}}, which means that the litigant is allowed to disclose only nothing (∅) or both
documents (d1d2). A disclosure policy δ implies a restricted game, in which the litigant’s
actions are limited to the options in δ.
Let U∗J (δ) denote the jury’s expected payoff in an artificial setting in which the jury
directly observes the maximal allowed disclosure of available documents (but does not observe
x), forms the proper posterior belief, and best responds.25 Let UJ(δ) denote the lowest
expected actual payoff of the jury in a rationalizable outcome of the litigation game in which
the litigant is restricted to disclosures in the set δ.
We can compare two disclosure policies, δ and δ′, where δ′ is a subset of δ. Note that
U∗J (δ)−U∗J (δ′) is the face value of the additional hard evidence allowed in δ, which is nonneg-
ative because policy δ allows more disclosure sets. The loss possible under δ is U∗J (δ)−UJ(δ)
and the loss possible under δ′ is U∗J (δ
′)− UJ(δ′), so the difference is the potential additional
welfare loss due to the allowance of more disclosure sets under δ. The potential loss ratio is
defined as
L(δ, δ′) =
U∗J (δ)− UJ(δ)− [U∗J (δ′)− UJ(δ′)]
U∗J (δ)− U∗J (δ′)
.
When applied to the basic, single-document model with δ = {∅, {d}} and δ = {∅}, this
measure is equivalent to the loss ratio L defined earlier.
5.1 Conditions for Misleading Hard Evidence
The following results provide conditions for effective and misleading hard evidence. First,
we have conditions guaranteeing full disclosure, so that all hard evidence is effective. Let
δFull = {∅, {d1}, {d2}, {d1d2}} and let δ0 = {∅}. The definition of γ is unchanged from the
basic model.
Theorem 4: Suppose that there are no limits on disclosure (the δFull disclosure policy) and
q11(1− q21)
q10(1− q20) > γ and
q21(1− q11)
q20(1− q10) > γ.
25For the policy δ = {∅, {d1}, {d2}}, the maximal disclosure is not well defined in the event that e = d1d2.
We will not consider this policy here. In a general model, one might make the assumption that all policies
under consideration are closed with respect to unions, so that if d1 and d2 can be disclosed individually,
then disclosure of d1d2 is also allowed. An interesting question is whether such a restriction has merit on
efficiency grounds.
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Then the only rationalizable outcome entails full disclosure, the actual loss ratio comparing
δFull to δ0 is L(δFull, δ0) = 0, and hard evidence is effective.
Note that the condition of Theorem 4, which can also be written as f(dk, x |1) > f(dk, x |0)
for all x ∈ X and k = 1, 2, means that existence of exactly one document is sufficiently
strong positive evidence to outweigh any negative inference from the private signal x. It
also implies that existence of both documents is likewise strong. The proof of this theorem
requires several rounds of the iterated-elimination procedure.
We next show that policy δBundle, which makes each document inadmissible on its own
but allows the two documents to be admitted as a package, has advantages if the face-value
signal provided by the documents is not so strong as to satisfy the presumption of Theorem 4.
We do this in two steps, first comparing δBundle to δ0 and then comparing δFull to δBundle.
Note that
q11q21
q10q20
>
q11(1− q21)
q10(1− q20) and
q11q21
q10q20
>
q21(1− q11)
q20(1− q10) .
We shall focus on the range of parameter values such that
q11q21
q10q20
> γ >
q11(1− q21)
q10(1− q20) and
q11q21
q10q20
> γ >
q21(1− q11)
q20(1− q10) . (7)
Theorem 5: Suppose that
q11q21
q10q20
> γ.
In every rationalizable strategy profile of the litigation game in which the litigant is restricted
to disclosures in the set δBundle, the litigant always discloses both documents when they both
exist. Hard evidence is effective and the actual loss ratio for δBundle compared to the no-
evidence policy δ0 is L(δBundle, δ0) = 0.
Theorem 6: Suppose that Inequalities 7 hold. In the setting with no limits on disclosure
(the δFull disclosure policy), there are rationalizable outcomes in which disclosure of a single
document is misleading but disclosure of both documents is effective, and there are also ratio-
nalizable outcomes in which all hard evidence is effective. The potential loss ratio comparing
δBundle to δFull is L(δFull, δBundle) > 1.
For intuition, one can see that there are multiple equilibria of the game under policy δFull.
There are an infinite number of sequential equilibria in which the litigant discloses both
documents when they both exist and otherwise discloses nothing. In such an equilibrium,
the jury’s beliefs satisfy b(d1), b(d2) < r < b(d1d2) because the jury associates disclosure of
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one document with an adverse (for the litigant) realization of x. There is also an equilibrium
featuring full disclosure and r < b(d1), b(d2) < b(d1d2). If, for instance, a litigant with
a single document believes that the latter equilibrium is being played, whereas the jury
believes that the litigant behaves according to the former equilibrium, then disclosure of a
single document is misleading to society’s detriment (lowering social welfare compared to
the outcome under policy δBundle).
5.2 Implications for Courts
Analysis of the two-document model allows us to expand on the policy implication developed
in the basic model by examining a wider range of admissibility rules. Theorems 5 and 6 yield
the following general conclusion.
Policy Implication 2: To ensure robust use of evidence in litigation, the court sometimes
must require that multiple documents be admissible only as a bundle (not individually).
This conclusion brings to mind a common occurrence in the court: When an attorney
attempts to present marginally relevant evidence, the judge asks where the presentation is
headed and what the attorney intends to establish, and the judge allows the evidence under
the expectation of additional complementary evidence to follow. McCormick (1972) notes
that the judge has the discretion to “ask the proponent what additional circumstances he
expects to prove.”
6 Legal Rules
We turn next to discuss, in light of our theory, two specific legal rules in the United States:
Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404. We include brief accounts of two prominent le-
gal cases and associated numerical examples. We also comment on some related work on
exclusion in the literature.
6.1 Relevance and the Law
Thayer viewed evidence law in the typical trial process as focusing on the following four
issues: 1) materiality, meaning the facts to be proved; 2) relevance; 3) admissibility; and 4)
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the evaluation of weight or probative force of evidence.26 The first three are matters for the
judge. The fourth is for the jury or other trier of fact.
Consider first the issue of relevance. In reality, most pieces of evidence presented in
support of a case are available in different states with different probabilities and thus are
statistical in nature. The legal terms probative (providing proof regarding a claim) and
relevance (tending to strengthen the particular claim being assessed) suggest that the in-
terpretation of evidence is often a matter of establishing a degree of confidence rather than
reaching a conclusion with certainty.27 Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states:
“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than
it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the
action.”28
So clearly the law embraces the notion that evidence is statistical, and relevance is the
determination of whether the evidence provides a signal of the claim being evaluated. We
note that the law also appreciates incremental evidence—which we might call marginally
relevant—at least to the extent that several such pieces can be combined to make a stronger
signal.29
On the issue of weighing the evidence (Thayer’s fourth item), note that although the judge
can provide guidance to the jury, the jury weighs the evidence and this makes the issue of
robustness and the potential for evidence to be misleading critical. Thayer described the
26Modern reform of the law of evidence relied heavily on the ideas of James Bradley Thayer, many of
which are contained in Thayer’s A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (1898). See, for
example, Anderson, Schum, and Twining (2005), Swift (2000), and Twining (1994). The discussion here
draws from Anderson, Schum, and Twining (2005), which has a nice presentation of these issues.
27This is not to say that near certainty is never achieved. One such actual case involved a person named
Juan Catalan being accused of shooting and killing 16 year-old Martha Puebla, who was to testify in a
murder case against Catalan’s brother and another Vineland Boyz gang member, Jose Ledesma. For details
of the case, see Rubin and Bloomkatz (2008). The charges against Catalan were eventually dismissed when
his attorney was able to acquire video showing him at a Los Angeles Dodgers game at the time of the
shooting. In this case, Puebla was shot in front of her home, and her parents and neighbors heard the
gunshots, so witnesses could identify the exact time of the crime. The video evidence pinpointed Catalan in
the stadium at exactly the same time.
28Further, the Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules for Rule 401 include the following: “The
rule summarizes this relationship as a ‘tendency to make the existence’ of the fact to be proved ‘more
probable or less probable.. . . ’ The standard of probability under the rule is ‘more probable than it would
be without the evidence.’ Any more stringent requirement is unworkable and unrealistic.”
29In United States v. Pugliese (2d 1946), Pugliese was accused of possessing unstamped distilled spirits.
Judge Learned Hand, when considering the relevancy of testimony by a former tenant of Pugliese that
Pugliese had previously possessed unstamped spirits in the same location, said: “Its relevancy did not, and
indeed could not, demand that it be conclusive; most convictions result from the cumulation of bits of proof
which, taken singly, would not be enough in the mind of a fair minded person. All that is necessary, and
all that is possible, is that each bit may have enough rational connection with the issue to be considered a
factor contributing to an answer.” (Wigmore §12)
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analysis of evidence as being governed by “logic and experience.”30
6.2 Exclusion – Rule 403
Thayer focused on two principles regarding admissibility: a) evidence that “is not logically
probative of some matter requiring to be proved” should not be received, and b) all probative
evidence should be allowed “unless a clear ground of policy of law excludes it.”31 He argued
for judicial discretion for admissibility.32 He suggested that the judge should have discretion
to exclude evidence that is “slightly” or “remotely” relevant, and may “complicate the case”
or “confuse, mislead, or tire the minds” of the jury.33
In practice, admissibility may depend on the degree of relevance weighed against the
potential for misleading the jury. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states the
following:
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, con-
fusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.
Further, the notes of the Advisory Committee for Rule 403 state that “The case law recog-
nizes that certain circumstances call for the exclusion of evidence which is of unquestioned
relevance.”34
Our modeling exercise addresses why it may be useful to exclude evidence that has
clear probative value and relevance. Exclusion is meant to avoid evidence being misleading,
which can occur when the degree of relevance is low compared to the strength of the litigant’s
30Anderson, Schum, and Twining (2005) suggest that “an alternative interpretation is that the criteria for
the weight of evidence are provided by probability theory, of which there are many versions.” We suggest
that these views of evidence fit with our model.
31See Thayer, pages 206 and 530.
32Swift (2000) describes this as follows: “First, the exercise of judicial discretion in admitting or excluding
evidence is, to use Professor Jon R. Waltz’s term, ‘guided’ decision making. The judge’s choice to admit or
exclude is not unrestrained by fixed principles. Rather, the judge has some flexibility in choice of outcome,
but is restrained by standards articulated in the rules of evidence law. These standards may come from a
code or from appellate rulings, and the judge must apply them on the record.”
33See Thayer, page 516. Further, in the case of United States v. Pugliese (2d 1946) mentioned earlier,
Judge Hand writes: “It is true that evidence rationally probative ought sometimes to be rejected if it is
likely unduly to complicate the issues, and prolong the trial. . . .”
34Swift describes Rule 403 as “the primary example of guided discretion in modem evidence law.” It is
worth noting that Swift is concerned with judges being given too much discretion with little scope for review
by an appellate court. These focus on judicial decisions about admissibility of expert witness testimony,
scientific proof, and character evidence.
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private information. Thus, we provide a rationale for Thayer’s recommendation to exclude
evidence that is slightly relevant and may confuse the jury. Further, our results may provide
some guidance for judicial discretion and the balancing of relevance against the potential
for misleading the jury. We note that one can view the potential loss ratio L > 1 as
corresponding to the “substantially outweighs” description of Rule 403. Interestingly, it
seems, in practice, misleading evidence is viewed as less of an issue for bench trials. This
may fit with the coordination issue we explore since coordination between a judge and litigant
may be easier. See Capra (2001).35
As an example, consider the classic case of Robitaille v. Netoco Community Theatre Inc.,
305 Mass. 265. Robitaille was injured after falling on a stairway at the Netoco Community
Theatre and sued for damages. There was a thick carpet on the stairway and a critical issue
in the case was whether the carpet was loose, which could have occurred due to the tacks
holding it in place having come out. A few weeks before the accident two girls fell on the
stairway when the carpet was loose. At trial, Robitaille was allowed to present evidence that
the two girls fell although there was not evidence that the condition of the stairway at the
time of Robitaille’s fall was the same as at the time of the earlier fall. Robitaille did not
present evidence that spoke to whether the carpet was loose at the time of her accident. On
appeal, it was ruled that evidence of the prior accident with loose carpet should not have
been allowed.
Numerical Example
We construct a stylized example based on this case. This is done in the context of the
events that potentially lead to the relevant likelihood ratios. The time line below describes
the timing of events.
1. The following exogenous random draws occur at the time of a possible prior accident:
• The rug is loose (`) with probability 1
2
and not loose (n) with probability 1
2
.
35In Gulf States Utilities Company v. Ecodyne Corporation, 635 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth
Circuit said:
Excluding relevant evidence in a bench trial because it is cumulative or a waste of time is
clearly a proper exercise of the judge’s power, but excluding relevant evidence on the basis of
”unfair prejudice” is a useless procedure. Rule 403 assumes a trial judge is able to discern and
weigh the improper inferences that a jury might draw from certain evidence, and then balance
those improprieties against probative value and necessity. Certainly, in a bench trial, the same
judge can also exclude those improper inferences from his mind in reaching a decision.
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• The “prior accident” (a) occurs with probability 1
2
if the carpet is loose and with
probability 1
8
if the carpet is not loose.
2. If the carpet was loose and there was a prior accident, the theater owner becomes aware
of the carpet being loose. Otherwise, the owner is not aware of the carpet’s condition
and has no action to take.36
When aware of the loose carpet, a “good” owner, occurring with probability 3
4
, repairs
the loose carpet. A “bad” owner does not repair the loose carpet.37 Following this
stage, we describe the carpet as being loose by L and not loose by N , where L is the
case if and only if the rug was previously loose (`) and either no prior accident occurred
or it occurred and the owner is bad (so the carpet is not repaired).
3. A random patron visits the theatre. If L, an accident occurs with probability 1
2
. If N ,
an accident occurs with probability 1
8
.
4. If an accident occurred at Date 3, a lawsuit is initiated and the patron (the litigant in
our model) receives a private signal x ∈ {x, x} = X about the condition of the carpet.
This private signal represents the patron’s observation of the carpet just before or after
the accident, and the observation occurs with noise. Assume that conditional on N , x
is realized with probability 1
4
and x is realized with probability 3
4
. Conditional on L, x
is realized with probability w and x is realized with probability 1− w.
Additionally, the litigant possesses document d if and only if there was a prior accident
that occurred with loose carpet (that is, when a and ` occur).
Our model picks up this story at Date 4, conditional on the accident occurring. Recall
that the litigant is the patron, as in the Robitaille case. The state θ refers to whether the
owner is liable, in which case the jury and society would like to reach a judgment of liability.
Liability (θ = 1) is the event in which, conditional on the accident occurring, the carpet is
loose (L), the prior accident occurred with loose carpet, and the owner did not repair the
carpet. That is, conditional on the accident occurring, a, `, and L together imply θ = 1.
Non-liability (θ = 0) is the complement event, conditional on the accident occurring. Note
36We assume this for simplicity. A richer example that has the good owner more likely to become aware
of the carpet being loose has similar qualitative results.
37One can motivate the two x-types of owner on the basis of the cost of repairing the carpet, with the
good owner having a small cost and the bad owner facing a large cost. Also, if the “good” owner is more
likely to become aware of the loose carpet, the implications do not change.
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that we assume that in order for the case to go to trial, there must have been an accident.38
By constructing an event tree and calculating the probabilities of the various paths, we
obtain the following conditional probabilities:
f(d, x | 1) = w, f(d, x | 0) = 1
36
,
f(d, x | 1) = 1− w, and f(d, x | 0) = 3
36
.
Note there are two possibilities for evidence to be misleading here. Naturally, this depends
on how informative the litigant’s private signal x is, which depends on the value of w.39
Note that if ψ = 0 then Inequality 3 reduces to f(d,K0 | 0) > f(d,K0 | 1) and f(d,K1 |
0) < f(d,K1 | 1). Because there are just two x-types of litigant in this example, the key
question is whether either f(d, x | 0) > f(d, x | 1) and f(d, x | 0) < f(d, x | 1) or f(d, x |
0) < f(d, x | 1) and f(d, x | 0) > f(d, x | 1), for in both of these cases hard evidence can be
misleading.
Consider first the case in which f(d, x | 1) = w > f(d, x | 0) = 1
36
and f(d, x | 1) =
1 − w < f(d, x | 0) = 3
36
. This requires w > 33
36
. So for large values of w, meaning that
the patron has an accurate private signal of whether the carpet was loose at the time of the
litigant’s accident and x suggests it was loose, the conditions for evidence to be misleading
are satisfied. Next consider the case in which f(d, x | 1) = w < f(d, x | 0) = 1
36
and
f(d, x | 1) = 1 − w > f(d, x | 0) = 3
36
. This requires w < 1
36
. Thus, the conditions for
evidence to be misleading are also satisfied for small values of w, which again means that the
patron has accurate private information about the carpet (with L now being indicated by
x). Thus, for extreme values of w, where the litigant’s private signal is informative relative
to the hard evidence, there is a rationalizable outcome in which evidence d is misleading.40
To relate these observations to the set of equilibria, note there are two perfect Bayesian
equilibria (PBE): an uninformative one in which d is never disclosed and an informative one
in which the litigant discloses d whenever he possesses it. Consider the case with w > 33
36
so x suggests the carpet was loose at the time of the litigant’s accident. The uninformative
38This does not change the qualitative results for the example. A compelling motivation for this is that
if there were no accident then the case would likely be dismissed. Of course, in practice not all frivolous
lawsuits are dismissed. In that direction, we also note that, given our simplifying assumptions for this
example, when the litigant does not possess d, she knows that θ = 0, but it’s also possible that the litigant
possesses d when θ = 0. So there is concern about evidence potentially being misleading here.
39Note that since the probabilities with which x and x are realized is fixed following N , the informativeness
of the private signal only depends on w.
40We note that these may be more extreme than in practice since we hold the probability of x fixed and
consider only w, the probability of x.
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equilibrium relies on if the document is disclosed, the jury believes it was x-type x who
disclosed it. Suppose that the litigant of x-type x anticipates play of the uninformative PBE
and does not disclose d, the x-type x litigant anticipates play of the informative PBE and
discloses d when she possesses it, and the fact-finder anticipates play of the informative PBE
and updates accordingly. This results in b(d) > r, which is exactly the opposite of what is
implied by the litigant’s behavior.
6.3 Character Evidence – Rule 404
There is a general reluctance to allow character evidence or evidence of a prior conviction
about a defendant in a criminal case. Rule 404 states “Evidence of a person’s character or
character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character or trait.” Here, we do not explore the more nuanced issues
concerning a criminal defendant who chooses to testify at his trial.41 Instead, we consider
general ideas such as those found in People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441, a well-known case in
which the defendant testified, and focus on evidence of a prior conviction presented in that
case.
Harvey Lynn Beagle II appealed his conviction by a jury of attempted arson and arson.42
Here is a brief summary of the relevant facts of the case. On May 25, 1969, Beagle was
kicked out of Rudy’s Keg because he “became intoxicated and obnoxious while a patron in
the bar.” At the time, Beagle made comments, about hiring someone to “fire bomb” the bar.
Then in the afternoon of July 1st, Beagle asked the owner of the bar if he could return to the
bar and was told no. Later that night, the roof of the building that housed the bar caught
fire after what seemed to be an explosion. The bar owner put out the fire and discovered a
soda bottle containing gasoline and a wick. Shortly after that, Beagle was arrested at his
nearby apartment. He smelled of gasoline and had several books of matches in his pockets.
Beagle appealed on several grounds. One of these was that evidence of his having a prior
conviction for writing a bad check was allowed. The Supreme Court of California found this
inappropriate.43 The general idea is that a judge should have discretion to exclude some
41There is a bit more judicial discretion when the defendant testifies as a witness since there is scope for
using character evidence or evidence of prior convictions to impeach a witness. These are important details
and we think the general theme fits with our results. There are potentially different rules for a civil case.
42The Supreme Court of California heard the case on January 5, 1972.
43It noted: “Although we reject all of the many contentions presented by defendant on appeal from the
judgment, we nevertheless conclude, inter alia, that a trial judge must exercise his discretion to prevent
impeachment of a witness by the introduction of evidence of a prior felony conviction when the probative
value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. (See Evid. Code, §352.)”
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prior convictions from being admitted as evidence.44
Numerical Example
Consider a numerical example, motivated by Beagle, in which a prosecutor may choose
whether to disclose d, which represents evidence of a prior conviction of the defendant for
writing a bad check. A time line of the events follows.
1. A random draw determines whether there is a bad check prior conviction (c) or not
(n). Evidence d exists if and only if c is realized. Assume c occurs with probability 1
2
and n occurs with probability 1
2
.
2. If c is realized, the person either reforms, which we denote by g, or has a higher propen-
sity for criminal behavior, which we denote by b. Assume g occurs with probability 1
2
so that b also occurs with probability 1
2
.
3. The defendant is matched with a bar/situation. The type with no prior conviction
commits the crime with probability 1
5
, type g with probability 1
10
, and type b with
probability 1
2
.45 If the defendant does not commit the crime, with probability 1
5
some-
one else does.
4. Following commission of the crime and the defendant’s arrest, the prosecutor’s private
information x is realized as follows.46 If the defendant has no prior conviction, x = a.
For type g, x is realized with probability 1
4
and x is realized with probability 3
4
. For
type b, x is realized with probability w and x is realized with probability 1− w.
44The court noted that the nature of the prior conviction and whether it reflects badly on the defendant’s
honesty or integrity is a factor in determining whether it should be allowed to impeach the defendant as a
witness. How recent the prior conviction was is also a factor. Additionally, it’s noted that a prior conviction
for a similar crime should be “admitted sparingly.” The court cites Judge (later Chief Justice) Burger in
Gordon v. United States (1967) 383 F.2d 936, 940-941 [127 App.D.C. 343] on these. The idea is that prior
convictions for similar crimes may put significant pressure on a jury to convict. The court also suggested
that the effects on the incentive for the defendant to testify should also be considered. We suggest that all
of theses issues fit with our model.
45Regarding the probabilities with which each type commits the crime, we note the following. Someone
who has been convicted of writing a bad check might learn from the experience, and wish to avoid any
further legal problems. For that type of defendant, the prior conviction for writing a bad check may actually
make it less likely that he would commit a crime like arson. On the other hand, it’s possible the conviction
caused the defendant to feel animosity towards those in authority, including someone who owns a bar and
can prevent him from drinking there. In this case, the prior conviction may make it more likely that the
defendant would commit arson.
46The prosecutor may be better informed than the fact-finder regarding the defendant’s type. The infor-
mativeness of x and x about the litigant’s type depends on w.
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Our model picks up the story at Date 4. Since we’re considering the prosecutor’s disclo-
sure decision, θ = 1 corresponds to the defendant being guilty. We assume that the case is
not brought when the crime is not committed by someone.
By constructing an event tree and calculating the probabilities of the various paths, we
obtain the following conditional probabilities:
f(d, x | 1) = 1
40
+
w
2
, f(d, x | 0) = 3
40
+
w
6
,
f(d, x | 1) = 3
40
+
1
2
[1− w], and f(d, x | 0) = 9
40
+
1
6
[1− w].
As in the previous numerical example, there are two possibilities for evidence to be
misleading here. Naturally, this depends on how informative the litigant’s private signal is.
Here, this depends on the value of w.47
Consider first the case in which f(d, x | 1) = 1
40
+ w
2
> f(d, x | 0) = 3
40
+ w
6
and
f(d, x | 1) = 3
40
+ 1
2
[1 − w] < f(d, x | 0) = 9
40
+ 1
6
[1 − w]. This requires w > 11
20
. So for
large values of w, meaning that the prosecutor has an accurate private signal of whether the
previously convicted defendant has reformed and x suggests b, the conditions for evidence
to be misleading are satisfied. Next consider the case in which has f(d, x | 1) = 1
40
+ w
2
<
f(d, x | 0) = 3
40
+ w
6
and f(d, x | 1) = 3
40
+ 1
2
[1 − w] > f(d, x | 0) = 9
40
+ 1
6
[1 − w]. This
requires w < 3
20
. So the conditions for evidence to be misleading are satisfied also for small
values of w, which again means that the prosecutor has accurate private information about
whether the previously convicted defendant has reformed and x suggest b. We conclude that
for extreme values of w, where the litigant’s private signal is informative relative to the hard
evidence, there is a rationalizable outcome in which evidence d is misleading. The failure to
coordinate here is similar to that in the previous example.
6.4 Related Work on Exclusion
The idea that exclusion of evidence can improve fact-finding is unique to common law
systems.48 Many economic models of the trial process, which typically assume that the
fact-finder is able to process information without limitations, have difficulty explaining the
exclusion of relevant evidence. We note that our results concerning exclusion fit very closely
with those found in the Federal Rules of Evidence and the common law.
47Note that since the probabilities with which x and x are realized is fixed following N , the informativeness
of the private signal only depends on w.
48See, for example, Damaska (1997).
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Lester, Persico, and Visshers (2009) provide a clever explanation for the exclusion of
evidence that focuses on cognitive limitations of the fact-finder. In their model, it is costly
for the fact-finder to evaluate evidence. This potentially results in the fact-finder’s incentives
in evaluating evidence not being aligned with those of society in terms of accuracy of decision
making. Thus, there is scope for the judge making some relevant evidence inadmissible
to improve the decisions made by the fact-finder by preventing some socially non-optimal
evidence evaluation by the fact-finder. We do not dispute this line of research and we accept
that real fact-finders have cognitive limitations, not withstanding our rationality assumption
here. However, Lester, Persico, and Visshers speak of their own work as providing “several
results pointing to the difficulty of eliciting general principles that can inform the exclusion of
specific pieces of evidence as a general rule,” and we believe our approach offers a foundation
for general principles.
Two other related papers that also make insightful contributions to the question of ex-
clusion are Sanchirico (2001), and Schrag and Scotchmer (1994). Sanchirico suggests that
a potential wrongdoer’s choice of action does not influence character evidence so character
evidence should not be used to provide incentives.49 Schrag and Scotchmer make a related
argument. While we find this argument compelling, we note that it does not explain all of
the issues related to exclusion. Lester, Persico, and Visshers (2009) note the following:
This argument relies on the predictability of exclusion on the part of the potential
wrong-doer. A salient feature of Rule 403 in the US Federal Rules of Evidence,
in contrast, is the latitude given the judge to exclude evidence on a case-by-case
basis. That latitude seems to run counter the incentive-giving argument because
it makes it difficult for the potential wrongdoer to foresee what evidence might
be excluded.
7 Conclusion
We have developed a model of statistical evidence with a sophisticated Bayesian fact-finder,
applying the rationalizability concept to study robustness of reasoning about hard evidence
and fact-finder decisions. Our model identifies the two channels of information inherent in
evidence disclosure: The direct implications of the hard evidence disclosure, which we call
the face-value signal, and a signal of the litigant’s private information that relates to the
49Sanchirico’s main example is a bar patron who is deciding whether to assault another patron who is
annoying him. The argument is that if the trial decision focuses on trace evidence of whether assault
occurred, even a defendant who has a history of assault in bars would have appropriate incentives.
34
litigant’s strategy. The theoretical exercise provides a simple framework to explore how these
two channels of information interact. It yields conditions under which the signal of private
information can outweigh the face-value signal, which leads to the possibility that evidence
is misleading.
Our modeling exercise is based on the position that it is practically impossible for the
law to commit courts to an optimal mechanism that dictates how evidence is interpreted.
There are too many idiosyncrasies in individual cases for overarching rules to be useful,
and the law would not be able to describe exactly what the interpretation should be for
every specific case. Indeed, just to determine whether a particular legal rule applies to an
individual case requires analysis and interpretation. In other words, fact-finders are in the
business of processing information and interpreting evidence, and this is an essential exercise
in the pursuit of society’s objectives. Thus, fact-finders are ideally Bayesian and the legal
system must recognize this, but the law (and courts) may optimally put some restrictions
on how fact-finders interpret evidence and make judgments. Realistic instruments in this
regard are admissibility rules and standards of relevance, which we take to relate to the
likelihood that evidence exists in different states. It is the fact-finder’s job to evaluate the
idiosyncrasies of individual cases, weigh evidence, and conduct a Bayesian analysis.
Our results suggest that it may be optimal, given robustness concerns, to restrict the
evidence that a fact-finder may consider, even disallowing some relevant evidence. The model
thus provides an explanation for the Federal Rules of Evidence Rules 403 and 404. Notably,
the evidence that should be excluded is that which is least relevant or would serve to confuse
the fact-finder, which in our framework means would be open to opposing interpretations
due to the relative weight of the litigant-type signal. The potential loss ratio provides an
interpretation of the scope for misleading evidence to “substantially outweigh” the probative
value of the evidence, as specified in Rule 403.
Future research may be useful to explore more deeply the incentives of players at the
“primary activity” stage (before litigation) and to pursue applications outside the legal
realm, such as in finance and marketing. Another avenue for future research is to model the
jury as a group of individual strategic actors rather than a single player as we have in the
current paper. One could then study how and whether members of a jury coordinate on
interpretation and meaning of evidence—a critical issue given that jurors come from many
different backgrounds and typically have not interacted with each other before (and few have
much experience as fact-finders).
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A Proofs and Calculations
A.1 Proofs
The theorems are restated here, along with notes and proofs.
Theorem 1: The following holds for every belief system satisfying plain consistency. The
jury’s posterior belief b(∅) satisfies Equation 2, where λ is the jury’s initial belief about the
litigant’s strategy. The jury’s posterior belief b(d) satisfies Equation 1, where λ is the jury’s
initial belief about the litigant’s strategy if it satisfies
∑
x∈X f(Θ, d, x)λ(x) > 0 and otherwise
λ is an arbitrary updated belief about the litigant’s strategy.
Proof: The proof features similar steps as in Watson (2017), Section 4. First, that b(∅)
satisfies Equation 2 is due to that the prior probability that the jury puts on the document
not being disclosed is strictly positive, and that plain consistency implies proper conditional-
probability updating when possible.
We must also show that b(d) satisfies Equation 1. As before, if
∑
x∈X f (Θ, d, x)λ(x) > 0,
then plain consistency implies that the jury uses proper conditional-probability updating in
order to arrive at Equation 1 upon observing document disclosure. We will now consider the
case when
∑
x∈X f (Θ, d, x)λ(x) = 0.
Note that Nature’s strategy in the litigation game is a selection (θ, e, x), and Nature
mixes according to the distribution f . Let SJ denote the jury’s strategy space and let SL
denote the litigant’s strategy space. For every x ∈ X, let SxL be the subset of SL that specifies
disclosing d in the event that x is the private signal and the document exists. Observe that
the sets {SxL} are distinct and not disjoint; for instance, for any given x and x′, the strategy
that always discloses belongs to both SxL and S
x′
L . Define:
WN(x) ≡ {(1, d, x)} YN(x) ≡ {(θ, d, x) | θ ∈ {0, 1}}
Y−N(x) ≡ SxL×SJ Z(x) ≡ YN(x)×SL×SJ.
Let Y (x) ≡ YN(x)×Y−N(x). Note that {Z(x)}x∈X is a disjoint collection of sets. Since
WN(x)×Y−N(x) ⊂ Y (x) ⊂ Z(x), clearly {Y (x)}x∈X and {WN(x)×Y−N(x)}x∈X are both
disjoint collections of sets as well.
Let hdJ denote the information set in which the jury has observed disclosure of the doc-
ument and must select the judgment a. Let S(hdJ) denote the strategy profiles that are
consistent with the game reaching information set hdJ. By the above definitions of the var-
ious sets, we have that S(hdJ) = ∪x∈XY (x). Further, the subset in which θ = 1 is given by
T ≡ ∪x∈XWN(x)×Y−N(x). Let ph denote the belief at information set h by the player on the
move there about the strategy profile being played; this is called an appraisal. We want an
expression for ph
d
J(T ), which is the definition of b(d), the probability that the jury puts on
θ = 1 in the event that the document is disclosed.
We can apply Watson’s plain consistency condition to get an expression for the jury’s
belief about θ at information set hdJ. Specifically, we relate player 2’s appraisal at h
d
J to her
appraisal at hJ, the artificial information set for the jury that signifies the beginning of the
game. The required conditions to apply plain consistency on each set Z(x) are satisfied.50
50See Watson (2017) for definitions used here.
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Sets Y (x) and Z(x) are comparable relative to Nature’s information set, hJ, and h
d
J. Further,
WN(x) ⊂ YN(x). Thus, plain consistency requires the jury’s appraisal at hdJ to be the product
of a distribution over Nature’s strategy and distributions over the strategies of the litigant
and jury. Further, the appraisal must preserve probability ratios in that
ph
d
J(WN(x)×Y−N(x))
ph
d
J(YN(x)×Y−N(x))
=
phJ(WN(x)×SL×SJ)
phJ(YN(x)×SL×SJ) , (8)
if both denominators are strictly positive.
Note that the terms on the right side of Equality 8 refer to the jury’s belief at the
beginning of the game about Nature’s strategy and, since this belief is initially accurate
because the jury knows the game being played, the right side is simply f(1, d, x)/f(Θ, d, x).
The denominator f(Θ, d, x) is strictly positive for all x ∈ X (recall that we assumed this
in the description of the model). Let us write µ(x) ≡ phdJ(YN(x)×Y−N(x)) for each x.
Multiplying both sides of Equation 8 by µ(x) and summing, we get∑
x∈X
ph
d
J(WN(x)×Y−N(x)) =
∑
x∈X
f(1, d, x)
f(Θ, d, x)
µ(x). (9)
Recall that the collection of sets {WN(x)×Y−N(x)}x∈X is disjoint and the union is T .
Thus, ph
d
J(T ) =
∑
x∈X p
hdJ(WN(x)×Y−N(x)). Also, phdJ(T ) defines b(d), so the left side of
Equation 9 is simply b(d). Because {Y (x)}x∈X is a disjoint collection and the union is S(hdJ),
we know that
∑
x∈X µ(x) = p
hdJ(S(hdJ)) = 1. Defining pi(x) ≡ µ(x)/f(Θ, d, x) for all x,
Equation 9 becomes
b(d) =
∑
x∈X
f(1, d, x)pi(x). (10)
Since
∑
x∈X µ(x) = 1, we have
∑
x∈X f(Θ, d, x)pi(x) = 1 and Equation 10 is equivalent to
b(d) =
∑
x∈X
f(1, d, x)pi(x)∑
x∈X
f(Θ, d, x)pi(x)
.
By construction, pi(x) ≥ 0 and ∑x∈X pi(x) > 0. For a small enough strictly positive number
φ and letting λ(x) ≡ φpi(x), we have that λ(x) ∈ [0, 1] for every x ∈ X. Furthermore,
because φ cancels in the fraction, we have
b(d) =
∑
x∈X
f(1, d, x)λ(x)∑
x∈X
f(Θ, d, x)λ(x)
,
which is exactly Equation 1 from the text and λ(x) may be interpreted as a probability. 
Theorem 2: If Inequality 3 holds and Inequality 4 is reversed, then the unique rationalizable
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outcome has the litigant disclosing d always at minimum probability ψ, the actual loss ratio
is L ∈ (0, 1], and hard evidence is ineffective. If Inequality 3 is reversed and Inequality 4
holds, then the unique rationalizable outcome has the litigant disclosing d whenever he has
it, the actual loss ratio is L = 0, and hard evidence is effective. If Inequalities 3 and 4 are
both satisfied, then there are rationalizable outcomes in which hard evidence is misleading
and the potential loss ratio is L > 1.
Proof: Let (a(d), a(∅)) denote the jury’s strategy, the first term being the jury’s action in
the event the document is disclosed and the second term being the action in the event the
document is not disclosed. Remember that sequential rationality requires a(d) = b(d) and
a(∅) = b(∅).
Suppose first that Inequality 3 holds and Inequality 4 is reversed. Then from Lemma 1
and Theorem 1 the jury’s posterior beliefs must satisfy b(d) < r ≤ b(∅) regardless of the jury’s
initial belief about the litigant’s strategy, and so the jury’s strategy must satisfy a(d) < a(∅).
In other words, every strategy of the jury that specifies a(d) ≥ a(∅) cannot be rationalized
and so is removed from consideration. Because the litigant knows this (rationalizability
assumes common knowledge of sequential rationality), every x-type of litigant strictly prefers
to not disclose the document, regardless of the exact belief about the jury’s strategy. This
means that there is a single rationalizable strategy for the litigant: σ(x) = ψ for all x ∈ X.
The jury knows this and therefore has the belief λ(x) = ψ for all x ∈ X, and hence the jury
accurately updates conditional on disclosure and no disclosure. Hard evidence provides its
face value scaled down by the parameter ψ, and so L ∈ (0, 1].
The same steps establish that if Inequality 3 is reversed and Inequality 4 holds, then
the jury’s strategy must satisfy a(d) > a(∅) and the litigant rationally must always disclose:
σ(x) = 1 for all x ∈ X. The jury knows this and therefore has the belief λ(x) = 1 for all
x ∈ X, and hence the jury accurately updates conditional on disclosure and no disclosure.
Hard evidence provides exactly its face value and L = 0.
Finally, consider the case in which Inequalities 3 and 4 both hold. Define beliefs λ+ and
λ− as follows:
λ+(x) =
{
1 x ∈ K+
ψ x ∈ K− and λ
−(x) =
{
1 x ∈ K−
ψ x ∈ K+
Let (b+(d), b+(∅)) denote the jury’s posterior beliefs derived from initial belief λ+ and let
(b−(d), b−(∅)) denote the jury’s posterior beliefs derived from initial belief λ−. From the
proof of Lemma 1, we know that b+(d) > b+(∅) and b−(d) < b−(∅). Thus, if the jury’s
initial belief is λ+ then the jury’s optimal strategy satisfies a(d) > a(∅) and if the jury’s
initial belief is λ− then the optimal strategy satisfies a(d) < a(∅). Any type of litigant can
rationalize disclosing with probability 1 in response to the former strategy and disclosing
with the minimum probability ψ in response to the latter strategy. Thus, no strategies are
removed from consideration.
Further, there is a rationalizable outcome that entails misleading hard evidence and a
loss greater than 1. Suppose the litigant’s actual strategy is σ defined by σ(x) = 1 for
x ∈ K+ and σ(x) = ψ for x ∈ K−. Let φ be the probability that d is disclosed when the
litigant behaves according to σ. Then r = φbσ(d) + (1− φ)bσ(∅) holds by the law of iterated
expectations, and we have bσ(d) ≥ r ≥ bσ(∅). Due to quadratic loss utility for the jury, the
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optimal strategy of the jury (if the jury knew that σ was being played) specifies a(d) = bσ(d)
and a(∅) = bσ(∅), and any departure from these actions would strictly reduce the jury’s
expected payoff. Specifically, lowering a(d) and/or raising a(∅) uniformly reduces the jury’s
actual expected payoff. Suppose that the jury’s actual strategy is the optimal one for initial
belief λ−, so that in fact a(d) < r ≤ a(∅). Then the jury’s actual expected payoff is strictly
less than it would be if the jury set a = r regardless of whether the document is presented,
which is the expected payoff in the setting without hard evidence. Thus, UJ < U
0
J and so
L > 1. 
Theorem 3: Suppose that hard evidence e and private signal x are independent conditional
on the underlying state θ, ψ = 0, and γ < γ. Let q1 be bounded away from 0 by a fixed
number. Then there is a number L > 1 so that, for γ ≤ q1/q0 ≤ γ, the potential loss ratio
satisfies L ≥ L.
Proof: This result follows directly from the analysis used to prove Theorem 2. We can
construct the rationalizable outcome described at the end of the proof. Because γ <≤ γ,
the actual loss L is strictly greater than 1 for all q0 and q1 such that γ ≤ q1/q0 ≤ γ. The
actual loss is a continuous function of q1 and q0, which are in a compact set given the lower
bound on q1, and so the actual loss is minimized over this set. The value L can be taken to
be the minimum loss. 
Theorem 4: Suppose that there are no limits on disclosure (the δFull disclosure policy) and
q11(1− q21)
q10(1− q20) > γ and
q21(1− q11)
q20(1− q10) > γ. (11)
Then the only rationalizable outcome entails full disclosure, the actual loss ratio comparing
δFull to δ0 is L(δFull, δ0) = 0, and hard evidence is effective.
Proof: Our analysis proceeds with a series of claims that we prove in turn. These identify
strategies that cannot be rationalized as sequential best responses and are thus removed in
the iterated procedure for rationalizability.
Claim 1: Whatever is the jury’s belief system, the posteriors satisfy b(d1d2) > r, b(d1) > r,
b(d2) > r, and b(∅) ≤ r.
Using Equation 6 in the text and simplifying, we find that b(e′) > r is equivalent to∑
x∈X, e⊃e′
[f(e, x |1)− f(e, x |0)]λe′(x, e) > 0. (12)
For e′ = d1d2, this becomes∑
x∈X
[q11q21p1(x)− q10q20p0(x)]λd1d2(x, d1d2) > 0. (13)
Recall that we assume q11 > q10 and q21 > q20. Along with the assumption for the theorem—
that Inequalities 11 hold—these imply that q11/q10 > γ and q21/q20 > γ. Also, we know that
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γ ≥ 1. So we have
q11q21
q10q20
> γ2 ≥ γ ≥ p0(x)
p1(x)
for all x ∈ X, which means that
q11q21p1(x)− q10q20p0(x) > 0
for all x. This proves that Inequality 13 holds regardless of λd1d2(·, d1d2), which implies
b(d1d2) > r.
For e = d1, Inequality 12 becomes∑
x∈X
[q11q21p1(x)− q10q20p0(x)]λd1(x, d1d2)
+
∑
x∈X
[q11(1− q21)p1(x)− q10(1− q20)p0(x)]λd1(x, d1) > 0.
The first summation expression on the left covers the case in which e = d1d2 and the second
one covers the case in which e = d1. The analysis above proves that the first summation
expression is positive. The second is also positive due to the first of Inequalities 11 and
because γ ≥ p0(x)/p1(x) for all x. At least one of the terms must be strictly positive for
some x, for otherwise λd1(x, e) = 0 for all x and e ∈ {d1, d12}, in which case the posterior
belief is not defined. This proves that b(d1) > r. The same steps establish that b(d2) > r.
To prove the last inequality of Claim 1, note that if the jury’s initial belief is that
λ∅(x, e) = 1 for all x and e, meaning that the jury expects no documents to ever be disclosed,
then b(∅) = r. Otherwise, by the law of iterated expectation and the fact that b(d1d2) > r,
b(d1) > r, and b(d2) > r, it must be that b(∅) < r.
Claim 2: Every strategy of the litigant with the property σ∅(x, e) > 0 for some x ∈ X and
some e 6= ∅ is not sequentially rational and therefore removed from consideration in the
iterative-elimination rationalizability procedure.
This claim follows immediately from the previous claim. From Claim 1, we know that,
for every nonempty disclosure, the jury rationally must choose a higher action than it would
if nothing is disclosed. Thus any strategy of the jury that would select a weakly higher action
following disclosure of ∅ cannot be sequentially rational and is removed in the first round
of iterated-elimination procedure. The litigant knows this and so it is never sequentially
rational to disclose nothing in a contingency in which the litigant possesses a document, and
strategies that would disclose ∅ are removed in the second round of the iterative-elimination
rationalizability procedure.
Claim 3: Given that the jury understands Claim 2, the jury’s belief system must satisfy
b(d1d2) > b(d1) and b(d1d2) > b(d2).
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Note that we can write the jury’s posterior belief about the state in this way:
b(e′) =

∑
x∈X, e⊃e′
(1− r)f(e, x |0)λe′(x, e)∑
x∈X, e⊃e′
rf(e, x |1)λe′(x, e)
+ 1

−1
(14)
To prove Claim 3, we start by noting that the jury’s belief about the litigant’s strategy must
satisfy λ∅(x, e) = 0 for every x ∈ X and every e 6= ∅, given Claim 2. That is, the litigant
must disclose one or both documents whenever he or she possesses some hard evidence. This
implies that, when the litigant possesses exactly one document, he must disclose it for sure
and so λd1(x, d1) = 1 and λd2(x, d2) = 1 for all x. Thus, the only behavior not pinned down
is what the litigant would disclose when possessing both documents.
Let us compare b(d1) with b(d1d2). To ease notation, define y(x) ≡ λd1(x, d1d2) and
z(x) ≡ λd1d2(x, d1d2). Using Equation 14, we have
b(d1) =
(1− rr
)(
q10
q11
)
1− q20 + q20
∑
x∈X
p0(x)y(x)
1− q21 + q21
∑
x∈X
p1(x)y(x)
+ 1

−1
and
b(d1) =
(1− rr
)(
q10
q11
)
q20
∑
x∈X
p0(x)z(x)
q21
∑
x∈X
p1(x)z(x)
+ 1

−1
.
Thus, b(d1) ≥ b(d1d2) is equivalent to
1− q20 + q20
∑
x∈X
p0(x)y(x)
1− q21 + q21
∑
x∈X
p1(x)y(x)
≤
q20
∑
x∈X
p0(x)z(x)
q21
∑
x∈X
p1(x)z(x)
. (15)
From the definition of γ, we know that the right side is maximized at the value γq20/q21 by
setting z(x) = 1 for the draw x ∈ X that identifies γ and setting z(x) = 0 for all other x
values. Here we are using the fact that A/B ≥ C/D > 0 implies (A+ C)/(B +D) ≤ A/B.
That is, including additional terms in the summations by raising z(x) above zero would only
lower the fraction.
We next show that the left side of Inequlity 15 is bounded below by 1. To demonstrate
this, let us write β0 =
∑
x∈X p0(x)y(x) and β1 =
∑
x∈X p1(x)y(x), so the left side can be
written as
1− q20 + q20β0
1− q21 + q21β1 =
1− q20(1− β0)
1− q21(1− β1) . (16)
Suppose β1 < 1. Since β1 and β0 are total probabilities over the same weighted fraction of
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the space X, there must be an x-type x′ ∈ X such that p0(x′)/p1(x′) ≥ (1 − β0)/(1 − β1).
Otherwise we would have a contradiction in summing over the complementary weighted
fraction of X. This means that γ ≥ (1− β0)(1− β1). From the assumption of the theorem,
we also know that q21/q20 > γ. Putting this together with the previous inequality implies
that q21(1 − β1) > q20(1 − β0), and thus the value in Expression 16 is at least 1. In the
case of β1 = 1, similar reasoning establishes that we must also have β0 = 1 and the value of
Expression 16 is 1.
In summary, we have shown that the right side of Inequality 15 is bounded above by
γq20/q21 and the left side is bounded below by 1. Because q21/q20 > γ, we therefore know
that Inequality 15 cannot hold, and therefore b(d1) < b(d1d2). The same steps establish that
b(d2) < b(d1d2).
Claim 4: Every strategy of the litigant with the property σd1d2(x, d1d2) < 1 for some x ∈
X is not sequentially rational and therefore removed from consideration in the iterative-
elimination rationalizability procedure.
From Claim 3, we know that the jury rationally must choose a strictly higher action when
both documents are disclosed that if exactly one document is disclosed. Thus any strategy of
the jury that would select a weakly higher action following disclosure of a single document
cannot be sequentially rational and is removed in the third round of iterated-elimination
procedure. As a result, it is never sequentially rational for the litigant to disclose a single
document when he possesses both documents, and such strategies are removed in the fourth
round of the iterative-elimination rationalizability procedure.
Combining Claims 2 and 4, we conclude that every rationalizable outcome entails full
disclosure. Because of this, the jury optimally responds as though the jury directly observed
the existing documents. Any non-optimal action choice is removed in the fifth round of the
iterative-elimination rationalizability procedure. 
Theorem 5: Suppose that
q11q21
q10q20
> γ.
In every rationalizable strategy profile of the litigation game in which the litigant is restricted
to disclosures in the set δBundle, the litigant always discloses both documents when they both
exist. Hard evidence is effective and the actual loss ratio for δBundle compared to the no-
evidence policy δ0 is L(δBundle, δ0) = 0.
Proof: The proof of this theorem follows the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 1 (and
Corollary 2), where we now interpret d1d2 as a single document. 
Theorem 6: Suppose that Inequalities 7 hold. In the setting with no limits on disclosure
(the δFull disclosure policy), there are rationalizable outcomes in which disclosure of a single
document is misleading but disclosure of both documents is effective, and there are also ratio-
nalizable outcomes in which all hard evidence is effective. The potential loss ratio comparing
δBundle to δFull is L(δFull, δBundle) > 1.
Proof: The proof is along the same lines as that of Theorem 2 using the description of beliefs
and behavior that follow the statement of Theorem 6 in the text. 
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A.2 Rule 403 Example Calculations
Based on the timeline and probabilities with which events occur specified in the example,
we can calculate joint probabilities f(e, x, θ, A), where A denotes that the accident occurred.
These are:
f(d, x, 1, A) =
w
32
, f(d, x, 0, A) =
3
512
,
f(d, x, 1, A) =
1
32
[1− w], f(d, x, 0, A) = 9
512
,
f(∅, x, 1, A) = 0, f(∅, x, 0, A) = w
8
+
1
64
,
f(∅, x, 1, A) = 0, and f(∅, x, 0, A) = 1
8
[1− w] + 3
64
.
From these, one can calculate the conditional probabilities, which suppress the A, found in
the text.
A.3 Rule 404 Example Calculations
Based on the timeline and probabilities with which events occur specified in the example, we
can calculate joint probabilities f(e, x, θ, A), where A denotes that the crime was committed.
These are:
f(d, a, 1, A) = 0, f(d, a, 0, A) = 0,
f(d, x, 1, A) =
1
160
+
w
8
, f(d, x, 0, A) =
9
800
+
w
40
,
f(d, x, 1, A) =
3
160
+
1
8
[1− w], f(d, x, 0, A) = 27
800
+
1
40
[1− w],
f(∅, a, 1, A) = 1
10
, f(∅, a, 0, A) = 2
25
,
f(∅, x, 1, A) = 0, f(∅, x, 0, A) = 0,
f(∅, x, 1, A) = 0, and f(∅, x, 0, A) = 0.
From these, one can calculate the conditional probabilities, which suppress the A, found in
the text.
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